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THE CHILD AS PHILOSOPHER
“You don’t know what I’m thinking,” my 3-year-old granddaughter called to me from her car seat.
Her out of-the-blue, metacognitive comment confirmed that, despite inconsistent performance on
false belief tasks, young children reveal sophisticated mindreading abilities in their spontaneous
talk (Shatz, 1994). At the least, she was concerned with knowledge in another’s mind. But her
statement suggested more: With no prior conversational context, and serving no communicative
or behavioral purpose, it seemed to be in the tradition of philosophy of mind. What kind of theory
of mind (TOM) lay behind it?
POSSIBLE THEORIES OF MIND
As scientists, we must consider the most economical, reasonable explanations for
behavior. Possibly, a minimal TOM, e.g., behavior-reading as clues to intention (Butterfill
and Apperly, 2013), could have accounted for her comment. Because I was driving and directing
my gaze elsewhere while she sat quietly, she probably knew that I lacked perceptual information
about her. (Behavior-reading handles well the findings on animal “mindreading,” Lurz, 2011).
However, comments about mindreading from competent language users like her may exemplify
more, namely, thinking about mind. Possibly she held “the doctrine of opacity of others’ minds,”
the belief that it is near impossible to know what another is thinking (Robbins and Rumsey, 2008).
In numerous Melanesian cultures, talk about others’ thoughts is inappropriate, but evidence
is lacking that mindreading does not happen (see Keane, 2008). Thus, the universality of
mindreading among human adults has not been seriously challenged. Indeed, discoveries with pre-
linguistic infants and animals have encouraged the view that, while possibly necessary for mature
mindreading, language is very likely subsequent to early TOM skills (e.g., Malle, 2002). Apparently,
children in Melanesian cultures still read others’ minds, but they must learn not to talk about them
(Schieffelin, 2008).
In Western cultures, social experience and family talk about mental states fosters TOM
development (see Antonietti et al., 2006). As the younger sibling in an upper-middle class American
family, my granddaughter very likely heard much talk about mental states and so would have been
unrestrained in talking about our minds. Still, one cannot know for sure whether she held a TOM
based on behavioral clues or on impossible access.
To explain improving performance with age, TOM theorists have proposed various mechanisms
such as a mindreading “module” with performance constraints, growing representational ability, or
social experience and language skill. Nichols and Stich (2003) even proposed a multi-component
theory drawing on previous accounts. These authors’ efforts, as well as later ones, show that no
single mechanism explains all the findings on different-aged humans and animals. The answer to
the question of who can read minds, when and how, is not simple.
Shatz A commentary on theory of mind
WHAT IS MINDREADING?
At the least, mindreading entails entity A assessing an internal
mental state of entity B that is not accessible from direct
perception. Hence, inference on the part of A is necessary.
(See Premack and Woodruff, 1979; They coined the term,
TOM.) Being a good reader of others’ behaviors apparently
is insufficient for “full-blown” TOM (Butterfill and Apperly,
2013). Mature mindreading is not constrained to a single
(e.g., competitive) circumstance. To account for mindreading-
like behaviors in animals and pre-linguistic infants while
not granting them mature TOMs, researchers have proposed
various minimal or two-system theories (e.g., Apperly and
Butterfill, 2009; Ruffman, 2014). Already their proposals have
garnered a variety of criticisms (e.g., Carruthers, 2014; Scott,
2014).
So, years after my granddaughter’s remark, and after studying
many recent arguments, I cannot definitively answer the question
of what kind of theory she had. Lurz et al. (2014) propose
“optimistic agnosticism” to address whether animals behavior-
read or mind-read, but I am not as optimistic as they that further
experimentation will establish the truth for either animals or
young children. Lurz et al. say that the evidence already favors
an innate module, even in animals, as the basis for TOM. The
notion of modularity comes from Fodor’s (1983) proposal of it as
the mind’s organizing principle. His work follows from the idea
of an innate human language capacity (Chomsky, 1965).
The language and TOM modules are similar in that both
have some innate bases or other, and both require environmental
input to achieve mature status, that is, “full-blown” TOM
and specific language competence. Nonetheless, the modules
and their developmental constraints are critically different. The
innate language module constrains syntax, allowing humans
to use limited data to develop a specific syntactic system.
Thus, the syntax module accounts for various features of a
language being packaged together so that when a crucial piece
of data is encountered, those multiple features can be acquired
simultaneously. In contrast, the mindreading module seems to
consist of a score of disparate, (albeit possibly innate) abilities
functioning together to produce early TOM-like behavior. As
these skills grow, so TOM ability grows, bringing success on
increasingly difficult tasks. Animal modularity may be different
from human modularity altogether, with entirely different
constraints (e.g., limited to competitive contexts; Barrett and
Kurzban, 2006). More clarity on the nature of TOM modules
is needed to decide which, if any, modules share more than an
ill-defined label.
The problem of clarity plagues other constructs in TOM
proposals as well. For example, the question of what they
represent when creatures mind-read is a conundrum because
there is no clear definition of representation. Without clear basic
constructs, there can be no determinative testing of modular or
any other TOM theories.
Only human children can acquire both false-belief
understanding and syntactic language. Several researchers
have proposed that language is the human ability that can
integrate early skills, leading to more advanced ones, (e.g.,
Spelke, 2003; Shatz, 2007). Or, humans may have a higher-order
cognitive capacity that accounts for both language and “full-
blown” TOM (see Penn et al., 2008; Shatz, 2008). Such proposals
may be agnostic with regard to whether animals’ abilities are
the evolutionary precursors to adult human strengths, but they
are not so with regard to the “pro-discontinuity” position that
humans are basically different from animals.
When my 3-year-old granddaughter said, “You don’t know
what I’m thinking,” my first and lasting impression was that she
had marked a crucial difference between us. The grandmother
in me credited her with a rather mature TOM. Although, my
scientist’s head may be more agnostic, it is not at odds with
my grandmother’s heart. I believe, even after perusing the last
decade’s work, that young humans have different TOMs from
animals. Proof awaits.
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